This paper is the first to directly estimate the determinants of differences in premiums received by public and private sellers in the market for bank branches (deposit bases). Deposit premiums received in private sector transactions exceeded those received by the FDIC and the RTC, even afier controlling for known characteristics of the transactions and afier corrections for possible sample selection bias. The observed differential disappeared by 1992, suggesting improved market efficiencyand/or the impact of FDICIA (1991), which mandated "least-cost" resolution procedures for failed institutions. Additionally, the evidence suggests that bank branches are Independent Value Objects whose auctions always result in "unintended" transfers of value to the winning bidders. This result, while consistent with previous literature that found positive Cumulative Abnormal Returns to the winners of auctions for the branches of failed banks, nevertheless suggests that not all of the positive CARScan be due to market ineticiency.
I. Introduction and Summary
During the period 1989 through 1992, at the peak of the U.S. banking crisis, the FDIC and the RTC auctioned off the branch buildings and associated deposit bases of 625 failed banks and 653 failed thrifis, respectively. Observers in the popular financialpress (e.g., American Banker, various) routinely viewed these government auctions as "fire-sales," generating sale prices, or "premiums," far below what would have been received in private sector transactions. Generally, the "low" prices were thought to be the result of legal and political pressures on the federal agencies to accomplish quick sales to acceptable bidders.
There is a substantial academic literature that has examined failed bank and thrifi auctions (see Section III below.) This literature though has not directly examined whether the government sales of failed banks and thrifis have realized returns lower than would have been achieved by private sellers. Rather, many studies have used event study methodology to test the related question of whether the winning bidders in the auctions show abnormal stock returns. Overall the conclusions of the studies have been mixed regarding whether the FDIC/RTC transactions do, in fact, give away value to winning bidders.
In this paper, we directly examine the difference in prices received by public and private sellers, by comparing the prices received in private sector branch sales and those received in the FDIC/RTC transactions, in cases where the private and public sector transactions were structured in similarfashion. Our analysis does find that the "deposit premiums" (prices) received by the FDIC and RTC from the auctions is substantiallylower on average than those received by private sellers of branches. Further, this gap in prices remains afier controlling for the known characteristics of the transactions, and afier sample selection corrections are used to attempt to control for differences in the "unobservable" characteristics between the public and private sales. The results do suggest that the differences between public and private prices fell over the sample period with only a small and statistically insignificantgap remaining in 1992. The post-1991 result suggests that changes in agency auction procedures, mandated by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991, may have contributed to improved sale prices in public-sector transactions (see Section IV below).
The obvious next question afier finding that FDIC/RTC premiums are (or were) low is why? One potential explanation is that buyers perceive (correctly or not) that the failed institutions being auctioned by the FDIC/RTC are inferior to the private branches being sold, for reasons that are not correlated with the transaction characteristics in our data sample.
Another potential explanation is that the auction procedures employed by the FDIC are inefficientrelative to the negotiated transactions used by private branch sellers. This total liabilityassumptions by the buyer (so-called "whole bank" deals), as well as variations of more limited transactions in which the buyer assumes only the deposit liabilities(and/or some other, limited non-deposit liabilities), and purchases some limited number of the failed institution's assets (generally, bank buildings and other fixed assets, and readily marked-to-market assets). While complicated whole-bank deals, involving complex government support of asset returns, received much of the research attention, the vast majority of government deals were structured in simple fashion, similarto private sector branch sale transactions (described below).
Banks and thrifis ofien buy and sell each others' branches in a well documented market. For example, during the period under observation (1989) (1990) (1991) (1992) , there were 197 private bank branch sales, and 320 private thrifi branch sales. In good times, the branch sale market is at least as robust as during crisis periods --from 1993 through Q1,1996 there were 619 total bank and thrifi branch sales. Institutions sell their branches, and associated deposit bases, for several reasons, including to raise their capital ratios and to improve their operating efficiency. For example, Bank A may find a particular branch to be a loss operation, due to the location and mix of business. However, Bank B may be willing to pay a positive purchase price for the same branch, because of the way it fits into Bank B's branch system. Some large banks routinely consider selling (buying) groups of branches, whenever the calculated rates of return on the associated deposit bases, on a sustained basis, are below (above) internal hurdle rates.'
In the typical private branch sale/purchase, the buyer assumes all or most of the deposit liabilities(the customer accounts) associated with the branch. Assets to balance the assumed liabilitiesconsist of fixed branch assets (buildings, etc.), readily marketable assets such as mortgage loans, and cash --as in the majority of government-conducted branch sales.
Generally, the buyer receives from the seller fewer assets (at market value) than the deposit liabilitiesassumed, the difference being termed the "deposit premium" and representing the seller's profit. The differences between public sector and private sector deposit premiums, if any, are the focus of the present study.
In previous studies, the existence of inefficienciesin public auctions of failed banks or thrifis generally has been inferred through the results of event studies. In these studies, "whole-bank" transactions generally have been mixed together with transactions that may be more narrowly characterized as "branch sales." The existence (absence) of cumulative abnormal equity returns to the winning bidder has been interpreted as meaning that the winner does (does not) obtain an unintended subsidy by acquiring the deposit base of the failed bank or thrifi. Also, some studies have examined the efficiency differences across types of FDIC transactions, but not between FDIC (RTC) branch sales and those of the private sector. Finally, a few studies have looked at the influence on FDIC deposit premiums of the number of bidders; but these studies did not compare FDIC premiums with private sector premiums or, with two exceptions, otherwise measure cumulative abnormal equity returns to winning bidders (see Section III following).
We directly compare public sector deposit premiums with those achieved in private sales by using a commercially availabledatabase that tracks these transactions for participants in the mergers/acquisitions arena. 3 The database provides an estimate of the deposit premium in each private and public sale, along with other variables describing the size and structure of the transaction. Note that the FSLIC studies dealt primarily with complex assistance transactions in the period before the RTC failed thrifi branch sales began to be structured like, and could be compared directly to, those of the private sector.
Each of the event studies suffers from the problem associated generally with event studies in this context --conclusions drawn from stock price movements rest on the assumption of information symmetry (i.e., stock market participants understand the nature of an assisted FDIC sale transaction). However, while private sector transactions are analyzed intensivelyin the financial press, the details of the government transactions are ofien never widely known, especially in the case of the larger, "whole bank" deals involving complex asset-value suppofis and associated tax benefits. The effects of the transactions may work their way into equity prices only afier long lags beyond the horizon of most event studies. In addition, the event studies generally involved low number of observations (The Davies study and the Billet et alia study had the most observations, 39 and 69, respectively).
Within these previous studies, several reasons are given why the public transactions might entail unintended subsidies to the winners, hence lower prices, than would be observed in private sales.GFirst the knowledge that the FDIC/RTC generally "must sell" the failed institutions, accepting the highest nonnegative deposit premium, could influence the bidding strategies of potential buyers.7 In contrast, private sellers can choose not to sell if no bid is sufficientlyhigh.
Second, government rules may reduce the competitiveness of the auction by requiring that the winning bidder must be "acceptable" to the government from a prudential standpoint.gThis may act to eliminate potential bidders with low capital ratios or other undesirable characteristics, driving down clearing prices. This argument is made notwithstanding the existence of "forbearance" in which low capital banks are nevertheless allowed to bid in failed bank auctions. Further, the usual regulatory scrutiny of private sales may also act similarlyin limitingthe pool of potential buyers. In addition, potential waiver of antitrust concerns for failed bank sales could even increase the number of potential buyers above those who could participate in private sales.
Studies focused only on gains from winning bids may also be subject to a selection bias by ignoring the costs of submitting losing bids. Many winning bidders bid on more than one transaction. Therefore, winning bids might be structured to cover the costs of failed bids. Event studies, focusing only on the effects on stock prices of winning bids, should therefore see either positive effects (to offset the unseen negative effects of lost bids) or no effects (if the stock market totally discounts the effects of all bids, winning or losing).
Auction theory also suggests that the nature of the object being auctioned could affect prices and CARS. Common-value (CV) auctions, where the value of the auctioned object is that the majority of FDIC cost differences across transaction types can be attributed to the selection of banks into resolution methods based on observed or unobserved qualitydifferences, leaving little to be explained by relative eficiency of resolution modes.
7 Alternatively, liquidation of the failed bank's deposits effectivelyentails a negative "premium." That is, the noninterest costs to the FDIC of mailing checks to each depositor are thought to be high enough so that liquidation is considered onlywhen there are no positive bids for the deposit base.
Technically,the FDIC does not "have to sell." Legally,it can create "bridge banks" into which to place the failed bank's deposits. However, long te~muse of bridge banks is not considered a valid option politically.
8In the past FDIC rules limited bidding to firms in the same geographic market as the failed bank, but these rules were removed long before the period under consideration here. assumed to be the same to all bidders but is unknown at the time of the auction, are subject to the "winner's curse". Failure of bidders to discount bids sufficientlyto account for winner's curse will cause prices to exceed values, therefore resulting in negative CARS. Alternatively, in independent private value (IPV) auctions, each bidder knows precisely the value of the object to him --but this value differs across bidders and the other bidders' values are unknown to each bidder. Optimally, the IPV auction bidder attempts to capture some of the surplus between his own valuation of the object and that of the next highest bidder, by bidding less than the object's true value to him. This underbidding, limited by the uncertainty about the other bids, results in a gain (positive CAR) for the winning bidder. Gilberto and Varaiya (1989) , in a study using information on the number of bidders,9 conclude that either failed bank branches represent independent private value objects, not common value objects, bidders are systematically ignoring winner's curse.10
Neither CV or IPV objects are inconsistent with government auctions that realize prices equal to those achievable by private sellers. However, if deposit bases~IPV objects, event studies showing positive CARS do not necessarily imply that FDIC/RTC auctions were conducted inefficiently. Further for IPV items, winning bids should be determined by the characteristics of the winning bidder as well as the characteristics of the branch deposit base being sold (including the characteristics of the markets in which the bidders and the branches reside). Bidders' valuations will reflect how the acquired branches fit into their own branch networks, and how the acquisitions might lead to scale, scope, or x-eficiencies, etc. Unintended subsidies stemming from auction inefficiencies,if they exist, could only be detected by direct comparison of FDIC/RTC premiums with those received in similar private sector transactions.
It by directly viewing the differences in private sector and public sector deposit premiums, we find the public sector premiums to be lower (higher) ceterzsparzbus, the next 9 See also Hirschhorn (1985) and Billett, Cobum, and O'Keefe (1995).
'0For more detail on auction models, see Riley andSamuelson,(1981). question is "why?" One possible explanation for low prices in FDIC/RTC sales is underinvestment by government sellers in marketing and information prior to the auction.
Experience with private and public sector transactions suggests that private sellers spend significantlymore than does the FDIC/RTC in both marketing the transaction and in providing due diligence information.ll Such information includes pre-paid independent appraisals of building values. In the absence of such appraisals, each bidder must separately pay for building appraisals (which reduces, dollar for dollar, the effective bid premium) or, facing uncertainty over the carrying value of fixed assets, bid lower to accommodate the uncertainty. Lower public sector branch deposit premiums could reflect suboptimal marketing and information expenditures on the part of the FDIC/RTC.
IV. Empirical Results.
The data used in this analysis covers both private and public sales of banks and thrifis form 1989 to 1992. It is crucial to the private sector/public sector comparison to use FDIC/RTC transactions that were structured in similarfashion to private branch sales. Thus, "whole bank" assisted transactions involving asset value supports or putback options were not used for comparison purposes. Only "purchase & assumption" transactions (without putback options) and/or "deposit transfers" were used. Also, FDIC/RTC transactions with total deposits above $200 millionwere excluded, since large transactions were more likely to be structured with significantasset-value supports (but where the existence of the supports would not necessarily be detected within the transaction database).12Even if no asset-value 11Oneof the authorsservedas a financialadvisoron severalmajorprivateandpublicbranch saletransactions.An informalsurveyof otheradvisorsprovidedsupportforthe viewthatprivate sellersspendmoreon pre-saleanalysis, commoninformationgathering, andmarketing.
12Transactionsalsowereexcludedif therewereno validpremiums, if no buyer(or sellerin the caseof privatesales)couldbe properlyidentified, if no geographic marketcouldbe identified, or if keyfinancialdata,suchas thatnecessaryfor the sampleselectionbiascorrection, wereunavailable.
supports were in place, the transfer to the buyer of a large portion of the failed institution's financial assets could result in implicit discounts (premiums) to the extent the transferring value of the financial assets was substantiallybelow (above) their true market value. To minimizethis possibilitywe also excluded public transactions in which 75 percent or more of the failed institution's assets were transferred to the buyer of the deposit base. The resulting observations, for which all explanatory variables could be calculated, numbered 134 FDIC deals, 271 RTC deals, 51 private bank branch deals, and 64 private thrifi branch deals over the four year period.13 Table 1 Deposit premiums (the difference between the deposits assumed by the buyer and the value of the balancing assets, divided by the acquired deposits) average about 1.7 percent and are noticeably higher for private sales than for public sales. For banks, the average deposit premium in private sales is over 2.5 times that for public sales, with the difference somewhat higher for thrifi deposit sales. The empirical analysiswill determine how much of this difference in deposit premiums between the public and private sales can be explained by the characteristics of the deposit base being sold, the selling firm, and the buying firm. The residual unexplained difference is either due to unobserved differences in these characteristics or due to inherent differences in the sales practices of the public sellers. The primary variables of interest in the regression are the dummy variables (Govt89, Govt90, Govt91, Govt92) indicating that the observation was a government (public) sale during each year. The results indicate that in all years the deposit premiums received in public sales were, on average, lower than in 'comparable' private sales. This statement, of course, assumes that the control variables in the model do an adequate job of capturing the relevant differences between the characteristics of public and private transactions. The A primary determinant of the value of the deposit package being sold is the share of core deposits, measured by CORE. Core deposits, defined as deposits in accounts under $100,000, are more valuable than other deposits because they are more likely to remain with the branch for a longer period of time and because they are less sensitive to interest rates. As expected, a positive coe~lcient for CORE does indicate a higher premium (price) is paid as the percentage of core deposits rises. The other major characteristic of the deposits in the model is the growth rate of the deposits, GROWDEP, measured over the last year before the transaction. Higher growth in deposits over the recent past should indicate a better franchise that will result in continued growth in deposits in the fiture. The positive coefficient on GROWDEP supports this. A dummy variable, BANK, is also included to indicate that the deposits being sold are from a bank (rather than a thrifi). As shown, bank deposits command higher premiums, cete]'isparibus, than those of thrifts.14 Several variables are entered to describe the attractiveness of the market area where the deposits being sold are located. MARKDEP measures the size of the total deposits in the market area; deposits tend to be worth less in areas with larger quantities of deposits (perhaps because customers are more price conscious in large markets). POPOFF is defined as the population per banking ofice in the local market and represents a measure of the degree of competition in the area. Higher values for POPOFF reflect less competition and/or more opportunity for deposit growth for the branches that are included in the sale. Regional dummy variables are also included in the model to control for differences in average prices received in different parts of the country. Estimates indicate that premiums were higher in 14 The size of the transaction (deposits or number of branches sold) does not statistically tiect premiums.
the SOUTHEAST and for thrifis in the MIDWEST. Banks in the midwest, though, are estimated to command lower premiums relative to other banks, as the negative BANK*MW coefficient outweighs the MIDWEST effect.
Characteristics of the buyer included in the model are BUYEQUITY, BANKBUY, SAMEMSA, and B~SAME.
BUYEQUITY measures the equity ratio of the buying firm;
buyers with more equity pay higher premiums on average. This result probably reflects the fact that deposit acquisitions are accounted for as cash acquisitions rather than pooling of interests. Therefore, regulatory capital ratios (especially tangible equity ratios) necessarily decline as a result ofa deposit purchase. Institutions with higher equity ratios thus can "afford" branch purchases (from a regulatory viewpoint) more than other banks or thrifis.
BANKBUY is a dummy variable indicating when there is a bank or bank holding company buyer and a thrift branches being sold. Bank holding company or bank winners of the thrifi branches paid 54 bp more for the branches than did thrifi winners, in both private and public transactions. Possibly, the banks viewed the thrifi acquisitions as providing diversification, or the operating efficiency of the banks generally exceeded those of the thrifis, so that bank winners could be expected to reap greater x-efficiencies (by transforming thrifi branches into better petiormers at any output level) than could the thrifi winners. It is also possible the bank winners intended to "cross-sell" the thrifi customers an array of "bank-like" products.
The variables SAMEMSA and B~SAME (for bank sellers) indicate whether the buyer and seller are located in the same market. The significantnegative coefficient on BANKSAME shows that winners paid less (more) for bank branches if the branches were in the same (different) market as the winner. This effect is not evident for thrifi sellers as SAMEMSA has a small (not significant) positive sign. Overall, the fact that buyer characteristics are significant determinants of premiums paid in branch sales is supportive of a conclusion that bank branches are IPV type objects that vary in value between potential bidders.
Deposit premia are expected to vary over time with the value of additional deposits to First, all of the public sales involve failed institutions, ones that were taken over by the government because of insolvency. An obvious concern is that the deposits of failed institutions are systematicallyless valuable than the deposits of institutions that do not fail because the event of failure might be partly determined by the value of the deposit base of the depository. Although conceptually this selection does occur, the effect is alleviated 15The formula for the Mill's ratio and the underlyingprobit models are shown in the Appendix.
because the failure of a depository is always caused by the poor performance of the assets (e.g. defaulted loans) rather than poor quality liabilities,and the degree to which the deposit values of failed institutions is biased is thus uncertain. The model uses two variables to measure and correct for this potential bias. One variable, TGLAM, represents the sample selection effect for failed thrifis, and the other, BGLAM, represents the sample selection effect for failed banks.lG The signs of the thrifi and bank selection effects differ and neither of the coefficients on these variables is statistically significant.
A second type of selection effect for failed banks could be caused by the process used to resolve failed banks and thrifis. As discussed earlier, the FDIC and RTC used several methods for resolving failed banks, but only the "pure" sales of deposit bases are included in our analysis. Thus, our data sample excludes observations where banks and thrifis were sold via "whole bank" transactions or "purchase and assumption" transactions involving substantial amounts of transferred loans. Rather, in our sample, the main asset types used to balance the transferred deposits were branch buildings, mortgages and other assets transferred at current market values, and cash. As shown in Berkovec and Liang, FDIC procedures for selecting failure methods during 1987 to 1990 did result in a selection of lower-valued institutions that sold in the deposit-only sales. However, it is unclear whether these effects can be expected to result in any empiricallyimportant effects on observed deposit premiums in this analysis, since asset quality, not deposit quality, was still the predominant selection criteria used by the FDIC and the RTC. Further, afier 1990, fewer of the failed bank resolutions tended to include loan sales with deposits. In any event, JLAM is as attempt to measure the selection bias caused by the criteria used to select our estimation sample from the universe of 1989 to 1992 failed bank transactions.17 JLAM does not have any significantimpact on deposit premiums.
16TGLAM is the Mill's ratio calculated from an estimated thrift failure model and is entered onlyfor failed thrifis. BGLAM is calculated fi-oma bank failure model and is entered onlyfor failed banks. Various forms of selection effects were tried, includingthe use of estimated failure probabilities for non-failed sellers. None were foundto be significantor have impo~lanteffects on the GOVT coefficients. 17JLAM is the Mill's Ratio calculated from a probit model where failed bank (thrifi) transactions are either in or out of the estimation sample.
Selection effects could also occur for the private sales in our sample. Mer all, private sales should occur only when the buyer values a branch more highly than the seller.
A positive selection bias would result if branch sales occurred when buyers identi~branches (of another institution) that are especiallyvaluable to them and are forced to pay premium prices to induce sales. Alternately, private sales could disproportionately consist of distress sales where sellers are selling assets to quickly raise capital, a situation that could lead to a negative selection effect on observed premiums. In the course of this analysis, various efforts were made to identifi available characteristics that are associated with private branch sales with the intent of creating selection correction terms for the private sales; these attempts were not successful. 
R2= .30
The GOVT variables estimate the remaining effect on deposit premia of government sales versus private sales by year, afier controlling for the other observed factors that influence deposit prices. These estimates indicate that there is a substantial negative average effect of government sales on deposit premiums in 1989-1991. The estimated size of the effect declines over time substantially;the estimated premium differential in 1991 is less than half that of 1989. Another 50 percent decline in magnitude is observed for the 1992 estimate, which is also negative but not statistically significantat conventional levels.
Overall, these results could indicate that the market discount applied to deposits of failed The public-private premium differential declined over the four-year period until, in 1992, it was eliminated (in the sense of statistical significance).
q Independent variables peculiar to the winning bidder were statistically significant in determining the level of the winning bid (these variables included the buyer's leverage ratio, whether the buyer was a bank or a thrifi, and (for bank buyers)
whether the buyer was located in a different market than the deposit base being sold).
Taken together, and in the context of the previous literature on this subject, these empirical results suggest the following conclusions:
Q Consistent with popular belief, during the period 1989 through 1991, either the two government agencies were relatively inefficient at the process of conducting "plain vanilla" deposit sales,~the market was slow to assimilate information regarding the existence of a premium differential. Over the four year span, however, the agencies and/or the market learned their lessons. The disappearance of a premium differential in 1992 may also be attributed to the passage of FDICIA in 1991. The Act required the FDIC to pursue "least-cost" resolution procedures and may have induced the agencies to more actively seek marketdetermined solution to the disposition of the deposit bases of failed institutions.
q "Unintended value" accrued to the winning bidders of the failed-bank and failed-thrifi deposit bases during the period 1989 through 1992 onlv~artiallv as a result of the agency and/or market inefficiencies. The statistical importance of buyer characteristics suggests that deposit bases are "independent private value" objects, and auction theory suggests that auctions of such IPV objects always entail winning bidders paying less than the true value of the object to the bidder.
Thus, to the extent previous event studies found cumulative abnormal equity returns to the winning bidders in government deals, these CARSwere only partially due to agency or market inefficiencies.
We can only speculate over the proximate causes of the perceived agency or market inefficiencies-perhaps the FDIC and the RTC did indeed feel political pressure to accomplish quick sales without benefit of optimal marketing expenditures. Whatever the reasons, this study suggests that prices did adjust over time, and, during the next banking crisis, the disposal of the deposit bases of the failed institutions might be accomplished with fewer misallocative effects. The buyer's tangible equity to total asset ratio; quarter-end prior to announcement.
Deposits in accounts less than $100,000 divided by total domestic deposits, quarter end prior to announcement. Ratio calculated for the sold branches, when possible; otherwise, for "seller" in the aggregate.
Percentage growth rate of branches, proxied by growth rate of "seller's" domestic deposits during year prior to announcement.
Mill's ratio.
Mill's ratio*Govt (where Govt = 1 if FDIC/RTC transaction in any year, Ootherwise).
Mill's ratio*Govt*BANK.
B. Probit Models for Calculation of Mill's Ratios.
The probit model underlying the Mill's ratio calculation is as follows: P = f( CAMEL88, DELTCAM, AST88, GROUP, GAS) where 
